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Abstract 
 
Random Boolean Network has been used to find out regulation patterns of genes in organism. 
This approach is very interesting to use in a game such as N Person PD. Here we assume that 
action is influenced by input in the form of choices of cooperate or defect he accepted from other 
agent or group of agents in the system. Number of cooperators, pay off value received by each 
agent, and average value of the group pay off, are observed in every state, from initial state 
chosen until it reaches its state cycle attractor. In simulation performed here, we gain information 
that a system with large number agents based on action on input K equals to two, will reach 
equilibrium and stable condition over strategies taken out by its agents faster than higher input, 
that is K equals to three. Equilibrium reached in longer interval, yet it is stable over strategies 
carried out by agents. 
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1. Introduction 
One of interesting aspects in understanding complex social system is about how simple 
interactions occur among elements constitutes it: human individual interactions emerge as 
complex macro phenomena (Paczuski, 2000). In Sociology, this concept later known as human 
agency (Fuch, 2002; Situngkir, 2003a) or structure of macro-micro linkage in social system 
(Sawyer, 2001; Situngkir, 2003b). 
Macro-micro linkage of the social system stated that macro phenomenon in the form of 
social structure (norms, social behaviors, organization, etc) are emergent phenomena coming out 
from interactions occurring in individual/micro level (Situngkir, 2003a; Frumkin, et al). The idea is 
similar to some sociologists who support structuration theory such as Giddens (1984) and Minger 
who also see that social structure is a macro phenomena resulted from an individual level 
interactions process (Fuch, 2002). 
In Game Theoretic Analysis, in this case Prisoner’s Dilemma, interactions among 
individuals viewed as mathematic model where those interactions interpreted only through 
watching its action of choose to cooperate or not to cooperate (defect). Simple interaction 
occurred in Prisoner’s Dilemma is believed to be a form of more elementary interaction than 
another more complicated intrapersonal interactions. 
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In analysis using Prisoner’s Dilemma, every individual action is not based on certain 
social structure; namely social norms, social behavior/habit or even social sanction (Robinson et 
al, 2000), henceforth we can virtually see whether certain social structure such as cooperation 
property is likely to emerge as a collective character from selfish agents that play. Human agency 
concept stating that social structure may emerge through interactions among their agents is 
highly appropriate in case of Prisoner’s Dilemma game. This game also has been known to be 
utilized in understanding complex phenomena occur in social and field of economy (Cho, 2000).  
In social system as well as in nature, it is known that someone’s action certainly affects 
the whole result gained by each person. ‘Free rider’ occasionally appears as a defector who takes 
advantage from a group of cooperators. The case which Hardin (1968) later named as Tragedy of 
Common happened in many cases of natural resources exploitation, which are commonly were 
not encountered within internal economy. Over-exploitation of one natural resource certainly will 
cause the decreasing result or advantages that we can actually get. 
As mentioned in the tragedy of common, social problems occur is hardly seen from 
individual level (microstructures). This is because each action chosen by an individual influenced 
by other individual actions in the system. To overcome this problem, evolutionary dynamic 
approach from Prisoner’s Dilemma model should be one of the ways to see individual situation 
and strategy that results maximum yields (Lindgren, et al, 1998).   
One of emergent phenomena from individual interactions in N-Person Iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma/NIPD game is cooperation among agents. This phenomenon has been widely observed 
in various approaches such as spatial models (Scweitzer, 2002), mean-field model (Lindgren, 
1998) and Ring Model (Alexander, 2002), and other forms of models. This cooperative 
phenomenon is interesting to observe, since it often happens in other systems, like company 
organization, living cells, up to molecular level (Axelrod, 1984). 
In the rest of the paper, we will show how N-Person IPD applied into the Random 
Boolean Network model. This paper is divided into several sections; the first explains what N-
Person Prisoner’s Dilemma is and followed by some description about the Random Boolean 
Network. Thus will be explained how to use Random Boolean Network to describing N-Person 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. This paper ends with some simulation results along with theoretical cause-
effect performed. 
 
 
2. N-person Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is a game models interaction between two persons, where each 
individual or agent plays without knowing other agent’s choice whether to cooperate (C) or not to 
cooperate/defect (D). Payoff that each agent will gain will depend on her choice and other agent’s 
choice. Payoff value received by each agent is commonly expressed in form of table matrix as 
seen in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Pay-off matrix of 2-person Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
 cooperate defect 
cooperate R S 
defect T P 
 
Where R represents the reward, T for temptation, S for sucker, and P for punishment. 
Dilemmatic condition will rise as these below conditions acquired: 
1. T>R>P>S 
2. 2R>S+T 
By noticing those pay-offs, in one round play, whatever action taken by other agent, each agent 
will tend to choose cooperate (C) – Nash equilibrium from this single play is easily understand 
that agent will tend to cooperate. However, if the game has a chance to play once more, then 
each agent will evaluate payoff gained and chosen in the previous round. Such game is called 
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
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This IPD model is then developed into a game involving higher number of agents, be it 
for 3 persons (Akiyama, et al, 1995) or for N-person (Axelrod, 1997; Akimov, 1994; and Lindgren, 
1998). This kind of game has been widely used to explain the emergence of cooperation in group 
of agents where every agent in the group is selfish and interacting playing Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game. 
In one round game, there will be n agents that choose 2 options of actions served – just 
as well as in 2-person PD, they are to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). Payoff achieved by agents 
will depend on number of cooperators, say it p numbers, so each agent will gain payoff for each 
option she takes, be it cooperate or defect. We may state payoff value received by agent as 
p
Cφ = pay-off value obtained by cooperate agent and pDφ  = pay-off obtained by defect agent. 
Value pDφ  should be higher than pCφ , yet this pay-off value (φ ) for each agent will rise along with 
the rise of number person who chooses cooperate, and so the whole agents pay-off in the group. 
This dilemma can be formulated as follows:  
 
1. pDφ > pCφ ………………………………..(1) 
2. pC
p
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p
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In one round game of the NIPD, rational option that is most likely to be taken by each 
agent is defect, yet if all players choose defect, thus each player will surely gain lower value than 
if all choose to cooperate.   
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Describing agent interactions in n-IPD has been improved widely and commonly there 
are two types of models widely used to describe interactions occur: mean-field model where all 
agents interact with all agents and spatial model, where agents lie in spatial distribution then 
interact locally. N-agents game becomes one choice of game model that is frequently used to 
understand aggregation from inter-component interaction to macro level in an evolutionary 
system (example: biology or social).  
 
 
3. Random Boolean Network 
Random Boolean Network (RBN) is generally constituted by certain numbers of node 
linked to input-output wire. For every time, each node states whether on or off as output, this 
output will become input to other nodes linked to it – and vice versa other node output will 
become input node for other nodes connected to it. Number of inputs linked to one node is equal 
to the connection with other nodes connected to it (possibly, plus one as the state from the node 
itself come to determine its next state). Further elaboration can be seen in Kauffman (1993). 
 n-1  p 
p
Cφ  
p
Dφ  
Pay-off ( )φ  
Figure 1 
Graphic of pay-off value in n-IPD for each agent  
Number of cooperator 
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Initial condition of on/off states is assigned with binary variables 0 and 1 and in the 
following time (t+1) will be updated to suits rule transition of the state it has. This rule transition is 
equal to Boolean Function where number of the function will equal to
K22 . K represents the 
number of input. In other words, rule transition will describe nodes states at each time depend on 
the arrangement of input that flows.  
RBN is basically a directed graph, G = (N, E), which can be represented with N = (1,…, 
n), representing the number of nodes, and K = (1,…,k), representing the number of input for each 
node and rule transition if  = n,...,ff1 , that it owns.  
If a node, say i, has K neighbors K =(1,…, k), and the state of neighbors (which becomes 
input for node i) is stated as Ni = ( )kii ,...,1 , thus we state itS  as a condition of node i at time t, 
and iS0  stating initial condition of node i, then at each time the node will update its condition 
follows the following rule: 
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RBN application was pioneered by Stuart A. Kauffman (1993) to show the self-organizing 
patterns in collective set of autocatalysis and genes regulation in the body of organism. Through 
RBN, the dynamic patterns of system constituted by many elements whose inter-regulating 
connection - as well as in gene regulation and autocatalysis set - becomes possible to learn. 
Kauffman observed dynamic behavior of RBN in collective set autocatalysis and gene regulation 
by varying N (the number of system components) and K (input of components). From those 
variations, he found that system behavior affected by K value. From K value variation, system 
behavior is said to compartmentalize into three regions, they are order region Æ complex Æ 
chaos (Kauffman, 1993:188-203). Division of the three regions is made based upon the 
dimensions describing the characteristic of the system, i.e.: state cycle, number of the state cycle 
attractor, and its adaptation over perturbation forming the structure transformation and minimum 
perturbation. The minimum perturbation is performed by changing the binary condition of one 
constituent’s activity to its reverse activity while structural perturbation is performed by changing 
Boolean function from one function to a different function (Kauffmann, 1993:209-221).  
Order region, that is for RBN with K=1, assigned with crystallizing pattern in the system, 
most of elements present in separated loop with derivatives of state chain – system does not 
show dynamical patterns. Complex area or sometimes-called “the edge of chaos” occurs at K~2. 
In this area system behavior assigned with long relatively small state cycle and quite stable to 
perturbations –will return to initial basin attractor when it is perturbed. While in chaos area - occur 
when value K>2, is characterized with long and huge state cycle, large amount number of state 
cycle and is very fragile over perturbation even only with minimum change. Furthermore, the 
behavior of the state cycle is hard to predict and depends on its initial condition.  
 In a chaotic system, region with value K>2, we also can have order region by adding big 
value of variable P or homogeneity parameter. Homogeneity parameter is fraction of 1 or 0 from 
output of Boolean function, where the value will range over 0.5 – 1.0. From observation carried 
out by Bernard and Gerard (Kauffmann, 1993), it is discovered that if a network added by 
increasing value P, from 0.5 – 1.0, then behavior of a network would be getting to the order 
region. At P = 0.5, network becomes relatively chaotic while at P reaching 1.0 networks is 
relatively order. Hence, at certain network there will be found critical value of Pc that bridges 
chaos region and order one (Kauffman, 1993: 477-478). 
 
 
4. Gene Regulation and NIPD  
Looking at the requirements of the dilemma occur in NIPD represented by equation (1), 
(2), and (3), we can arrange a pay-off matrix for N-agents as seen in Table 2.  
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Number of Agent cooperates (cooperator) 
 p1 p2 _____  pi ____ pN 
 
Cooperate 
(C) 
1
Cφ  2Cφ  _____ iCφ  ____ NCφ  
Defect(D) 1
Dφ  2Dφ  _____ iDφ  ____ ____ 
 
 
 
Pay-off matrix in Table 2 can be formulated as follow:  
 
a. Pay-off for agent that chooses cooperate 
 
( ) ( )( )
N
pNxSpxR
C
−+=φ ………………………………(5) 
 
b. Pay-off for agent chooses defect 
 
   
( ) ( )( )
N
pNxPpxT
D
−+=φ ……………………………….(6) 
 
If we illustrate agent behavior equals to a gene regulation process in metabolism of 
organism body, where those genes will come whether to a catalyzed state or inhibited depends 
on other agent activities that becomes input to it, thus the same tool to explain that kind of 
regulation, then RBN can be applied in N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game.  
For an illustration, we will take example of 3-agents NIPD using RBN approach (Figure 
3). For 3 agents interacting randomly as well as in RBN, there will be 8 possible states (Table 3) 
as initial state. Those states will flow into next state, according to rule transition (Boolean 
function) that each agent has.   
 
 
 
1 2 3 
0 0 0 
0 0 1 
0 1 0 
0 1 1 
1 0 0 
1 0 1 
1 1 0 
1 1 1 
 
We have previously known that with K inputs for each node there will be 
K22 numbers of 
Boolean functions. In example of three agents in Figure 3, we see that input received by each 
agent is 2, so that there will be 162
22 =  possible Boolean functions (Red’ko, 1998). Those 
Table 2 
Table pay-off matrix for n-agent Prisoner’s Dilemma  
Table 3 
Possible state for 3 Boolean agents 
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functions will illustrate agent condition at t+1, when certain input combination received at time t 
(Table 4).  
 
 
 
 
 
Input at 
time (t) Agent 3 choice at t+1 
1 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
 
 
If the above Boolean Function is indexed as if , where i = (1,2,…,16) as in Table 4, thus, 
there will be Boolean Function if  of 16 for 2 inputs case. If we define agent strategy as set of 
choices whether to cooperate or defect taken by agent, where choices taken will suit a transition 
rule that it has, thus 1621 ,...,, ffffi = , will perform possible strategy that can be chosen by 
each agent in the system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While each agent choose every strategy randomly from 16 existing function and one initial state is 
chosen, it will flow the next state according to the rule transitions until it reaches an attractor 
state. For example, we assume agent 1 choose strategy 2, agent 2 choose strategy 9 and agent 
3 choose strategy 10, then we will obtain function as in Table 5.  
 
 
 
 
t t+1  t t+1  t t+1  
1 2 3  1 3 2  2 3 1  
0 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0  
0 1 0  0 1 1  0 1 0  
1 0 0  1 0 0  1 0 0  
1 1 1  1 1 1  1 1 1  
            
 
Table 4 
Possibility of Boolean Function for each agent  
Table 5 
Example of Transition Rule for 3 agents Boolean  
1 2 
Figure 3 
Interaction model for 3 agents in RBN 
3 
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With transition rule/Boolean function chosen, we will have the set of state from the 
system at each time as seen in Table 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
t t+1 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 0 1 1 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 1 0 0 0 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
 
The change of state from time to time suits the transition rule that each agent has (Table 6) will 
form a certain set pattern that is a cyclic called state cycle (Figure 4).  
By forming the set of state pattern, we can calculate number of aspects in Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, i.e.: the number cooperative and defective agent, pay-off received by agent or pay-off 
gained by the group of agents at every state (t, t+1, t+2, …) from initial state up to the state of 
attractor.  
Then we can define the loose agent as the agent with lower play-off and the winner 
whose highest pay-off. In the next round, the agent evaluates the strategy it has and will pick a 
better strategy from other possible Boolean Function. Here we have evolutionary NIPD, where 
one’s strategy may adapt with other strategy until she gains most mutual condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Such 3 agents RBN model can be modified further to larger agents model with input 
varied from 1 to N. By flowing the whole pay-off from the system at initial state to the attractor 
Table 6 
State transition for 3 agents Boolean 
000 011 110 001 
010 
101 
100 
111 
Figure 4 
Example of state cycle pattern for 3 Boolean agents  
State cycle 1 
State cycle 2 
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state, and pay-off gained by every agent, we can observe which strategy that is most beneficial 
for each agent and beneficial to the group.  
 
 
5. Model Inspiration  
 From the above explanation, we perform a set of experiment to see how IPD applied in 
RBN model. Before that, we have seen and analyzed another models that similar with our model  
i.e. Alexander (2002) and Paczuski et al (2000) models and compared it to the actual RBN model 
with some needed modifications on implementation to the RBN model so that it will really 
describe individual interactions as represented in IPD.  
In the ring model by Alexander (2002), the translation of N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma 
was performed in Random Boolean Network fashion. He assumed agents play Prisoner’s 
Dilemma in a network with ring formation, where each agent updates its state by rule: imitating 
winner neighbor state in order each agent calculates how much pay-off gained by every of his 
neighbors. Every agent assumed to know other agent state that is other neighbor’s neighbor. At 
that condition, agents playing in ring model described as a node that has input from its 2 closest 
neighbors node and the node itself (Figure 5). In this ring PD game, every agent supposed to link 
with 2 neighbors and play 2-person PD game. Pay-off obtained by agent only encountered only 
from neighbor agents, thus the social dilemma can not be described in such fashion.   
Different with Alexander (2002), Paczuski, et. al. (2000) described agents as well as in 
Random Boolean Network – with a goal to describe the economic model, i.e.: minority game, in 
RBN fashion. They viewed that every agent will ground her action on limited information he 
received from other agent or other group of agent. This condition was described in NK Random 
Boolean Network, where N represents the number of agent and K represents the number of input 
of agents or other group of agent. Agent’s strategy is made based on input she has, that picked 
from the possible Boolean Function. At every round every agent will gain reward and punishment. 
After certain interval, the looser, that is agent lies in majority group, will change her strategy 
randomly.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inspired by those models, we try to construct a new model of NIPD. In the model of 
Alexander (2002), we found that interaction among agents was only limited in the pre-defined 
ring, while human interactions model is highly vary and highly random interconnectedness. Many 
agents network that has inter-regulating connection is more proper to be described in NK Boolean 
Network model.  
Actions chosen by agent are varied and cannot be simplified into one strategy only. 
There will be numbers of strategy chosen by an agent in a group. From this point, we can see 
strategy as action probability taken responding every set of actions taken by other agents (input). 
This kind of strategy can be represented with possible Boolean Function. Every agent will decide 
whether to cooperate or defect, and as the consequences, she will get certain pay-off as well as 
in NIPD. Each agent, from the initial states to the last state will get certain pay-off. Agent who 
gets lowest pay-off may change her strategy by imitating strategy chosen by the winner. Further, 
we can see the evolution of the system in its macro state.  
Figure 5 
RBN for agents played in ring model of n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma  
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6. Simulation Results 
In this simulation, we use NIPD model in RBN with pay-off rule as expressed in equation 
(5) and (6). In this model choosing neighbor and initial strategy is performed randomly. Strategy 
of each agent chosen from Boolean rule table suits the K value used that is for K=2 used Boolean 
table of dimension 64x81.  Differ to model used by Alexander (2002), in this model every agent 
chooses strategy not option of cooperate or defect. 
The simulation result for 20 agents and K=2 is described in Figure 6. This result showing 
that the dominant strategy at the end of simulation is the second strategy of Boolean rule: 
cooperative when all neighbor agents cooperative. In Figure 7 we show a static (frozen) 
experimental result with the same initial setting.  
From this point, we can say that with K=2 and homogeneity parameter for each epoch 
(long-time scale where each agent changes her strategy) as shown in the picture gaining frozen 
or periodic depends upon strategy in the initial condition of each agent. In Figure 8, we show the 
simulation result when agent number N=100. In this simulation the agents change their strategies 
in every 10-rounds - by assumption that length attractor of the state cycle is ( N ) where N is 
number of agents. The changes are conducted by the rule that each agent imitate highest pay-off 
neighbor at every attractor length. Figure 8 shows that as the number of cooperator increases, 
the average pay-off of the group increases too. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 For value K>3, for example K=4 uses Boolean function matrix with large magnitude, that is 65536x16 – a 
very large dimension which is really difficult to run with computational resources that is used in this 
research. 
Figure 6 
Simulation result with K=2, N=20, and 100 times iteration. Initial condition chosen 
randomly results stable aggregate condition and periodic at its equilibrium 
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Figure 7 
Simulation result for K=2 and N=20 with frozen result at equilibrium  
Figure 8 
Experimental result with K=2 and N=100 with cyclic result at the equilibrium 
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7. Discussion 
We have described the behavior of the system whose bounded agent defect and 
cooperate with her neighbor agent. Every agent, based on her transition rule– choose whether to 
cooperate/defect (C/D) with her neighbor. At certain interval of time (state cycle length is 
assumed), every agent evaluate the result she gained in the form of average pay-off at the 
interval of time and change her strategy by using the strategy of her neighbor with highest 
average pay-off.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N=20 N=20 
N=30 
N=100 
Figure 9 
Pay-off for each agent for different number of agents 
Figure 10 
Experimental result with N=20 and K=3. The result tends to cyclic at equilibrium as the rise of homogeneity 
parameter 
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From Figure 7 and 8, system behavior in simulation for K=2 shows similarity with the 
dynamical patterns of NK Boolean Network.  System will quickly move toward its steady state 
condition - the length of state cycle is relatively short and stable enough on perturbation (the 
changes of agent’s strategy). This is shown by the average pay-off of the group repeating 
periodically in a very short interval. Pay-off value pattern for each agent is stable after the agent 
changes her strategy. Self-organizing patterns of the system with N=20 will be different when 
homogeneity variable differ. Homogeneity value is rising and tends to make system present in a 
frozen static regime.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 At value K=3 (Figure 10 and 11), system behavior is generally the same with K=2, 
dynamical patterns occur in the form of equilibrium appears cyclic. Yet, in the very long period, 
system will return to its initial condition when there is strategy change at interval 100. The 
increase of average homogeneity parameter explains why the system behaves differently for the 
same K. As shown in figures, system will be more order on the rise of its homogeneity variable.  
 In social system, where every person bases her action upon little information from a 
group of person consists of small number persons, system tends to be static, there will be no 
dynamical patterns and the system will be quicker to return to its equilibrium. However, if every 
agent bases her behavior or action on higher amount of information, then the system will tend to 
be relatively more dynamical and the equilibrium is assigned with in long period of time.  
Figure 9 shows that at equilibrium, player with same strategy is uncertainly will gain the 
same pay-off value. It is interesting since it often happens in reality where person that imitates 
other person’s strategy does not always get the same result. Here we show that our model has 
performed a unique character of every agent representing social system.  
In society, we can see that the increase of cooperator numbers will rise up average pay-
off. Although the paper has been able to show how NIPD in RBN fashion, yet the limited 
computational facilities caused the impossibility to gain spectacular conclusion of the NIPD 
discourse– e.g.: dominant strategy like tit-for-tat model strategy in dynamic model IPD (Axelrod, 
1984). Technically we can say that in this paper, we see the collective patterns caused by 
numbers of cooperators and pay-off value obtained by agent and her group, when she behaves 
as well as Boolean agent.  
Figure 11 
Simulation result with N=100, and K=3. State cycle length assumed less than 100, agent changes strategy at 
every end of state cycle 
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8. Conclusion 
We have shown how to perform iteration over NIPD in RBN fashion. In several 
experiments performed we show the potential of RBN model to be utilized as alternative genetic 
model – as claimed by Kauffman in (Kaufman, 1993, Paczuski, et.al, 2000). 
The smaller amount of agents whose high homogeneity will perform more stable system, 
a conclusion that showing that in a homogenous society conflict probability is seldom– agent 
tends to cooperate and system direction can be “predicted” easily. In return, social system 
becomes mode dynamic with the rise amount of agents. However, collective system will tend to 
reach its equilibrium (with certain pay-off) although it has to through a long process (large 
attractor length). This is the social system behavior performing the robustness in society and the 
fact of the self-organizing system. 
The weakness of this paper is known comes from the lack computational facilities good 
enough by means that further works will highly depend on better facilities to gain better 
conclusion and theoretical exploration.  
In short, we can say that RBN is an alternative to construct evolutionary model of social 
system with complex characters like self-organizing, adaptive, and evolve dynamically. These 
characters are more or less theoretically explained by RBN for organism metabolism widely – this 
paper is a mean of hope the same thing to view social system metabolism to be observed further.  
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